1001Philosophers

Duns Scotus vs William of Ockham

Duns Scotus and William of Ockham are the two great late medieval scholastics whose disputes over universals, signification, and the will set the terms for the late-medieval breakdown of the Aristotelian synthesis. Ockham was a generation younger and developed his philosophy in part as a critical response to Scotus.

At a glance

Duns ScotusWilliam of Ockham
Datesc. 1266 – 13081287 – 1347
NationalityScottishEnglish
EraMedievalMedieval
Movements Medieval Philosophy, Scholasticism, Christian Philosophy Scholasticism, Medieval Philosophy, Christian Philosophy
Profile Duns Scotus → William of Ockham →

Where they agree

Both held that the intellect is essentially individual rather than universal in its primary objects, both held strong views on the freedom of the will, and both worked within the Aristotelian-Christian tradition. Both took meticulous logic and the analysis of language as central to philosophical work.

Where they disagree

Scotus held that universals are real in some attenuated sense — what he called common natures, which exist in particulars and are individuated by haecceity. Ockham rejected common natures altogether: only individuals exist, and universal terms are mental signs without corresponding mind-independent universals. This nominalism, often summarized as Ockham's razor, shaped late-medieval and early-modern philosophy decisively, eroding the metaphysical apparatus of high scholasticism.

Representative quotes

Duns Scotus

  • “sic: si omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ergo maxime scientiam maxime desiderabunt. Ita arguit Philosophus I huius cap. 2. Et ibidem subdit: "quae sit maxime scientia, illa scilicet quae est circa maxime scibilia". Maxime autem dicuntur scibilia dupliciter: uel quia primo omnium sciuntur sine quibus non possunt alia sciri; uel quia sunt certissima cognoscibilia. Utroque autem modo considerat ista scientia maxime scibilia. Haec igitur est maxime scientia, et per consequens maxime desiderabilis.”

    If all men by nature desire to know, then they desire most of all the greatest knowledge of science . So the Philosopher argues in chap. 2 of his first book of the work [ Metaphisics ]. And he immediately indicates what the greatest science is, namely the science which is about those things that are most knowable. But there are two senses in which things are said to be maximally knowable: either b

  • “Quaestiones subtilissimae de metaphysicam Aristotelis , as translated in: William A. Frank, Allan Bernard Wolter (1995) Duns Scotus, metaphysician . p. 18-19”

    sic: si omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ergo maxime scientiam maxime desiderabunt. Ita arguit Philosophus I huius cap. 2. Et ibidem subdit: "quae sit maxime scientia, illa scilicet quae est circa maxime scibilia". Maxime autem dicuntur scibilia dupliciter: uel quia primo omnium sciuntur sine quibus non possunt alia sciri; uel quia sunt certissima cognoscibilia. Utroque autem modo considerat

  • “Quaestiones subtilissimae de metaphysicam Aristotelis , as translated in: William A. Frank, Allan Bernard Wolter (1995) Duns Scotus, metaphysician . p. 20-21”

    loquimur de materia "circa quam" est scientia, quae dicitur a quibusdam subiectum scientiae, uel magis proprie obiectum, sicut et illud circa quod est uirtus dicitur obiectum uirtutis proprie, non subiectum. De isto autem obiecto huius scientiae ostensum est prius quod haec scientia est circa transcendentia; ostensum est autem quod est circa altissimas causas. Quod autem istorum debeat poni propri

William of Ockham

  • “Plurality is not to be posited without necessity.”

    Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate

  • “It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer.”

    Frustra fit per plura, quod potest fieri per pauciora.

  • “Logic is the most useful tool of all the arts . Without it no science can be fully known. It is not worn out by repeated use, after the manner of material tools, but rather admits of continual growth through the diligent exercise of any other science. For just as a mechanic who lacks a complete knowledge of his tool gains a fuller [knowledge] by using it, so one who is educated in the firm principles of logic, while he painstakingly devotes his labor to the other sciences, acquires at the same time a greater skill at this art.”

    Summa Logicae (c. 1323) , Prefatory Letter, as translated by Paul Vincent Spade (1995)

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