Gilbert Ryle Quotes on Knowledge
Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind (1949) launched the postwar Oxford ordinary-language critique of Cartesian philosophy of mind under the slogan that the mental life of human beings is misdescribed when treated as the operations of a "ghost in the machine." The book's most lasting epistemological contribution is the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that — the practical mastery exhibited in skilled performance is not a covert exercise of propositional knowledge but a category of cognition in its own right, with its own conditions of attribution and learning. The framework prepared the ground for the later philosophical analysis of skilled practice from Polanyi to Dreyfus.
Quotes
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Attributed to Gilbert Ryle:
“Knowing how is not reducible to knowing that.”
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Attributed to Gilbert Ryle:
“It is not a contingent fact about thinking that it is bound up with language.”
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Attributed to Gilbert Ryle:
“We can know how to play chess without knowing the propositional rules.”
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“A myth is, of course, not a fairy story. It is the presentation of facts belonging to one category in the idioms appropriate to another. To explode a myth is accordingly not to deny the facts but to re-allocate them.”
Introduction -
“Ch. I: Descartes' Myth, (1) The Official Doctrine”
There is a doctrine about the nature and place of the mind which is prevalent among theorists , to which most philosophers , psychologists and religious teachers subscribe with minor reservations. Although they admit certain theoretical difficulties in it, they tend to assume that these can be overcome without serious modifications being made to the architecture of the theory.... The official doct -
“Ch. I: Descartes' Myth, (1) The Official Doctrine”
The mind is its own place and in his inner life each of us lives the life of a ghostly Robinson Crusoe. People can see, hear and jolt one another’s bodies, but they are irremediably blind and deaf to the workings of one another’s minds and inoperative upon them. -
“Ch. I: Descartes' Myth, (2) The Absurdity of the Official Doctrine”
Such in outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as " the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine ." I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category mistake. It represents the facts of m -
“Ch. I: Descartes' Myth, (4) Historical Note”
Myths often do a lot of theoretical good, while they are still new. -
“It is of first-rate importance to notice from the start that stupidity is not the same thing, or the same sort of thing, as ignorance. There is no incompatibility between being well-informed and being silly, and a person who has a good nose for arguments or jokes may have a bad head for facts.”
Ch. II: Knowing How and Knowing That, (2) Intelligence and Intellect -
“Ch. II: Knowing How and Knowing That, (10) Solipsism”
Contemporary philosophers have exercised themselves with the problem of our knowledge of other minds. Enmeshed in the dogma of the ghost in the machine, they have found it impossible to discover any logically satisfactory evidence warranting one person in believing that there exist minds other than his own. I can witness what your body does, but I cannot witness what your mind does, and my pretens