Henry Sidgwick Quotes
Henry Sidgwick was a 19th-century English philosopher and one of the most rigorous and systematic moral philosophers of the Victorian era. His 1874 work The Methods of Ethics is widely regarded as the most carefully argued statement of utilitarian ethics ever produced, comparing utilitarianism with rational egoism and intuitional moral common sense and concluding with what he called the dualism of practical reason. The quotes below are attributed to Henry Sidgwick, organized by topic.
Browse Henry Sidgwick by topic
Henry Sidgwick on Happiness
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Attributed to Henry Sidgwick:
“I see no escape from the conclusion that we ought to be guided by ultimate good, which is happiness.”
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“How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of now-existing human beings? The answer to this, though, seems clear: the time at which a man exists can’t affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; so the interests of posterity must concern a utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries —except in that the effect of his actions on the lives and even the existence of posterity must be more uncertain.”
Book 4, chapter 1, section 2 (7th ed., 1907)
Henry Sidgwick on Justice
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“The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view of the universe, than the good of any other.”
Book 3, chapter 13, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)
Henry Sidgwick on Knowledge
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“Book 3, chapter 13, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)”
The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view...of the Universe, than the good of any other ; unless, that is, there are special grounds for believing that more good is likely to be realized in the one case than in the other. -
“Book 3, chapter 13, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)”
Each person is morally obliged to regard the good of anyone else as much as his own good, except when he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him. -
“Book 4, chapter 1, section 1 (7th ed., 1907)”
We have next to consider who the “all” are, whose happiness is to be taken into account. Are we to extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain whose feelings are affected by our conduct? or are we to confine our view to human happiness? The former view is the one adopted by Bentham and Mill , and (I believe) by the Utilitarian school generally: and is obviously most in accord -
“Book 4, chapter 1, section 2 (7th ed., 1907)”
How far we are to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of now-existing human beings? The answer to this, though, seems clear: the time at which a man exists can’t affect the value of his happiness from a universal point of view; so the interests of posterity must concern a utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries —except in that the effect of his acti -
“Book 3, chapter 14, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)”
It is in their purely physical aspect, as complex processes of corporeal change, that [physical processes] are means to the maintenance of life: but so long as we confine our attention to their corporeal aspect,—regarding them merely as complex movements of certain particles of organised matter—it seems impossible to attribute to these movements, considered in themselves, either goodness or badnes -
“A universal refusal to propagate the human species would be the greatest of conceivable crimes from a Utilitarian point of view”
Book 4, chapter 5, section 3 (7th ed., 1907) -
“Book 4, chapter 5, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)”
A universal refusal to propagate the human species would be the greatest of conceivable crimes from a Utilitarian point of view
Henry Sidgwick on Politics
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“it is reasonable for a Utilitarian to praise any conduct more felicific in its tendency than what an average man would do under the given circumstances :—being aware of course that the limit down to which praiseworthiness extends must be relative to the particular state of moral progress reached by mankind generally in his age and country; and that it is desirable to make continual efforts to elevate this standard.”
Book 4, chapter 5, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)
Henry Sidgwick on Virtue
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Attributed to Henry Sidgwick:
“Common sense morality is a body of judgements that has grown up in society without systematic reflection.”
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Attributed to Henry Sidgwick:
“Reason supplies us with no premise from which to deduce that another's good ought to be the end of my action; we must take it as a self-evident principle.”
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Attributed to Henry Sidgwick:
“The object of ethical inquiry is to attain systematic and precise general knowledge of what ought to be.”
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Attributed to Henry Sidgwick:
“It is reasonable to take as one's ultimate end one's own greatest good and equally reasonable to take as one's ultimate end the greatest good of all; this is the dualism of practical reason.”
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“Each person is morally obliged to regard the good of anyone else as much as his own good, except when he judges it to be less, when impartially viewed, or less certainly knowable or attainable by him.”
Book 3, chapter 13, section 3 (7th ed., 1907)