John Mackie Quotes on Truth
John Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) and the prior “A Refutation of Morals” (1946) gave late twentieth-century analytic metaethics its most influential statement of moral error theory. The central thesis is that ordinary moral discourse claims to be reporting objective moral facts whose existence the reflective philosophical analysis cannot defend — the queerness of the supposed moral properties on the metaphysical side, and the parallel sociological diversity of actual moral commitments on the empirical side, jointly support the conclusion that the standard moral truth-claims are systematically false. The framework, drawing on Hume’s projectivist-sentimentalist tradition and the analytic moral-philosophical context Mackie inhabited at Oxford, shaped subsequent analytic metaethics through the contemporary moral fictionalism of Richard Joyce and the broader engagement with the metaphysical and epistemological status of moral truth.
Quotes
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Attributed to John Mackie:
“There are no objective values.”
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Attributed to John Mackie:
“Moral judgments make claims to objectivity, but those claims are false.”
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Attributed to John Mackie:
“If there were objective values, they would be entities of a very strange sort.”
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Attributed to John Mackie:
“Morality is not to be discovered but to be made.”
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Attributed to John Mackie:
“The argument from evil shows that the traditional conception of God is internally inconsistent.”