1001Philosophers

John Rawls vs Jurgen Habermas

Rawls and Habermas are the two most prominent late-twentieth-century theorists of liberal democracy, with Rawls representing the analytic tradition of political liberalism and Habermas representing the continental tradition of discourse ethics. Their direct exchange in the 1990s is the most extended dialogue between the two traditions on these questions.

At a glance

John RawlsJurgen Habermas
Dates1921 – 2002b. 1929
NationalityAmericanGerman
EraContemporaryContemporary
Movements Political Philosophy, Analytic Philosophy, Social Contract Critical Theory, Continental Philosophy
Profile John Rawls → Jurgen Habermas →

Where they agree

Both held that liberal democracy can be philosophically justified rather than merely politically defended, both held that justification must proceed without appeal to comprehensive religious or metaphysical doctrines, and both treated public reason as central to legitimate political authority. Both wrote against the postmodern dismissal of normative political philosophy.

Where they disagree

Rawls's political liberalism justifies principles of justice through hypothetical agreement under the constraints of an overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines; Habermas's discourse ethics justifies them through the implicit norms of actual communicative action. Rawls's framework is more clearly individualist and more focused on principles of distribution; Habermas's is more clearly intersubjective and more focused on the communicative procedures through which democratic legitimacy is generated. Habermas charges Rawls with insufficient grounding in actual democratic practice; Rawls charges Habermas with conflating philosophical justification with empirical sociology of communication.

Representative quotes

John Rawls

  • “The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.”

    Chapter I, Section 3, pg. 12
  • “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”

    Chapter II, Section 11, pg. 60
  • “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and attached to positions and offices open to all.”

    Chapter II, Section 11, pg. 60

Jurgen Habermas

  • “Subjects who reciprocally recognize each other as such, must consider each other as identical, insofar as they both take up the position of subject; they must at all times subsume themselves and the other under the same category. At the same time, the relation of reciprocity of recognition demands the non-identity of one and the other, both must also maintain their absolute difference, for to be a subject implies the claim of individuation.”

    Habermas (1972) "Sprachspiel, intention und Bedeutung. Zu Motiven bei Sellars und Wittgenstein". In R.W. Wiggerhaus (Ed.) Sprachanalyse and Soziologie . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). p. 334 | This is called the paradoxical achievement of intersubjectivity
  • “Habermas (1972) "Sprachspiel, intention und Bedeutung. Zu Motiven bei Sellars und Wittgenstein". In R.W. Wiggerhaus (Ed.) Sprachanalyse and Soziologie . Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). p. 334”

    Subjects who reciprocally recognize each other as such, must consider each other as identical, insofar as they both take up the position of subject; they must at all times subsume themselves and the other under the same category. At the same time, the relation of reciprocity of recognition demands the non-identity of one and the other, both must also maintain their absolute difference, for to be a
  • “This is called the paradoxical achievement of intersubjectivity”

    Subjects who reciprocally recognize each other as such, must consider each other as identical, insofar as they both take up the position of subject; they must at all times subsume themselves and the other under the same category. At the same time, the relation of reciprocity of recognition demands the non-identity of one and the other, both must also maintain their absolute difference, for to be a

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