Roderick Chisholm Quotes on Knowledge
Roderick Milton Chisholm was an American philosopher and one of the principal figures of mid-twentieth-century American analytic metaphysics and epistemology. This page collects quotes attributed to Roderick Chisholm on the topic of knowledge, drawn from across the philosopher's works.
Quotes
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Attributed to Roderick Chisholm:
“Epistemology must begin with the evident.”
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Attributed to Roderick Chisholm:
“The problem of the criterion is the central problem of the theory of knowledge.”
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“What we have been saying, of course, is not likely to convince the skeptics and we can hardly claim to have "refuted" them. But our question was not, "Can we refute the skeptics?" Our question was: "Are there positive reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of succeeding in the epistemic enterprise?" The answer seems to be that there are no such reasons. And therefore it is not unreasonable for us to continue.”
Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 1 : The Skeptic's Challenge -
“Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 1 : The Skeptic's Challenge”
What we have been saying, of course, is not likely to convince the skeptics and we can hardly claim to have "refuted" them. But our question was not, "Can we refute the skeptics?" Our question was: "Are there positive reasons for being skeptical about the possibility of succeeding in the epistemic enterprise?" The answer seems to be that there are no such reasons. And therefore it is not unreasona -
“In making their assumptions, epistemologists presuppose that they are rational, beings. This means, in part, that they have certain properties which are such that, if they ask themselves, with respect to any one of these properties, whether or not they have that property, then it will be evident to them that they have it. It means further that they are able to know what they think and believe and that they can recognize inconsistencies.”
Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 1 : The Skeptic's Challenge -
“Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 1 : The Skeptic's Challenge”
In making their assumptions, epistemologists presuppose that they are rational, beings. This means, in part, that they have certain properties which are such that, if they ask themselves, with respect to any one of these properties, whether or not they have that property, then it will be evident to them that they have it. It means further that they are able to know what they think and believe and -
“Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 2 : Epistemic Justification”
The category of being beyond reasonable doubt is illustrated by the proposition that the building in which I now find myself will be here tomorrow. The proposition is not evident. But for me—and I hope that for others— the proposition is such that believing it is more justified than withholding it. Obviously there are some true propositions which are such that we are more justified in believing th -
“It is sometimes said that playing it safe is always more reasonable than taking any chances. And this would seem to be the attitude of the Pyrrhonist with respect to what it is reasonable for us to believe. But the following principle is "anti-Pyrrhonian": (A3) If the conjunction p&q is beyond reasonable doubt for S, then believing p&q is more justified for S than believing p while withholding q”
Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 2 : Epistemic Justification -
“Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 2 : Epistemic Justification”
It is sometimes said that playing it safe is always more reasonable than taking any chances. And this would seem to be the attitude of the Pyrrhonist with respect to what it is reasonable for us to believe. But the following principle is "anti-Pyrrhonian": (A3) If the conjunction p&q is beyond reasonable doubt for S, then believing p&q is more justified for S than believing p while withholding q -
“Our second "anti-Pyrrhonian" principle is this: (A4) If anything is probable for S, then something is certain for S”
Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 2 : Epistemic Justification -
“Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 2 : Epistemic Justification”
Our second "anti-Pyrrhonian" principle is this: (A4) If anything is probable for S, then something is certain for S -
“The objectivity principle tells us what kind of justification we can have for beliefs about justification: (A5) If S knows that p, then, if S believes that he knows that p, then S knows that he knows that p”
Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed., 1989), Chap. 2 : Epistemic Justification